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How Does the Thai Million Baht Village Fund Impact Fertility in Thailand? 
 
Chairperson:  Douglas Dalenberg 
 
 
This study evaluates the impact of Thailand’s Million Baht Village Fund program on 
household fertility decisions. Thailand’s fertility rates are alarmingly low and it is 
imperative to recognize the unintended consequences a microfinance program may have 
on fertility choices within Thailand. Using panel data from pre- and post-program years, 
this research identifies the change in number of babies in a household associated with 
getting a microloan from the Village Fund program. The quasi-experimental nature of the 
program and an instrumental variable model with fixed effects identifies a negative 
relationship between the number of babies within families and participation in the 
microfinance program. Although the impact is statistically significant, the decrease in 
babies due to participation is not of practical significance. 
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 1 
1 Introduction 
 Microfinance programs are an important part of financial intermediation in 
developing countries. They help connect potential borrowers with small loans, especially 
in poor and rural areas. This research focuses on a government-funded microfinance 
program in Thailand. This program, Thailand’s Million Baht Village Fund, has a few 
qualities that give it a degree of exogeneity where most microfinance programs are 
endogenous and makes measuring the impacts of the funds difficult.  
 All Thai villages were eligible for the microfinance program and had to submit an 
application and form a village committee to be accepted. The program introduced funds 
into 77,000 diverse Thai villages accepted into the program. Each village received a 
transfer of one million baht (about $25,000),
1
 which was used to provide village members 
with small loans.  
 One aspect of the program that gave it a degree of exogeneity was its surprise 
onset after a quick dissolution of one political party and the rise to power of another. The 
second is the uniform amount distributed to each village. I will discuss these two 
elements in more depth in Section 3.2. 
To clearly understand if a microfinance program is a useful and efficient 
utilization of development funds, it is crucial to understand how these injections of credit 
are impacting the households, villages and larger economies exposed to them. 
Development economists are often focused on concrete and obvious determinants of a 
country’s development. There is a plethora of research on how different development 
                                                 
1
 During this time period, the exchange rate between dollars and baht was roughly 40 baht to 1 US dollar. 
 2 
policies and tools impact GDP, income per capita, and household consumption. These 
studies answer the question of how development tools, like a microfinance program, 
impact financial factors of development, but overlook the importance of other key 
features of a developed country.  
 Fertility rates are one such determinant of development. It is widely accepted that 
as countries develop, fertility rates drop. My research looks at the impact of The Million 
Baht Village Fund, on fertility in Thailand.  While many less developed countries have 
high fertility rates, Thailand is experiencing abnormally low fertility rates. With a fertility 
rate below the replacement rate,
2
 this means the Thai people are not having enough 
babies each year to maintain their population levels. This might not seem like an 
immediate problem, but prolonged years with a fertility rate below replacement rate (2.1 
births per woman) can results in serious labor shortages and adverse economic 
consequences.  
 Little research exists on the impacts of microfinance programs on fertility 
(Kuchler 2012;  Banjeree et al. 2015). My findings could help guide efficient 
development policy decisions in Thailand and other developing countries. The sign and 
significance of the impact of a microfinance program on fertility is important in Thailand. 
If the unintended consequences of a microfinance program have a negative and 
significant influence on fertility in a country with existing low fertility rates, then a 
microfinance program needs further consideration before it is implemented. By using 11 
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 The replacement rate is generally accepted to be roughly 2.1 births per woman and Thailand’s fertility 
rate was 1.5 births per woman in 2014 (http://data.worldbank.org). 
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years of panel data along with a combination of an instrumental variable and fixed 
effects, I hope to add to the existing literature.  
 My results show getting a microloan does decrease the number of children a 
household has, but the amount by which it decreases is insignificant in practical terms. A 
country should be aware that a microfinance program could cause decreases in fertility 
rates, but unless the influx of funds is massive, the decrease will not be substantial. The 
policy implications of these findings suggest that to avoid decreases in fertility a 
microfinance program should be accompanied by other policies that combat decreased 
fertility. In the case of Thailand, the other benefits of microfinance easily outweigh the 
small and insignificant cost. 
2 Literature Review 
2.1 Microfinance 
In the past 25 years, micro lending has become one of the most significant 
development policy tools. Lack of access to credit is arguably one of the main reasons 
people in developing countries have difficulty escaping poverty. Studies have shown that 
access to credit can increase productivity and quality of life in lower-income households 
(Khandker 1998).  Without a loan from a formal or informal institution, many people find 
it impossible to save the funds to start or expand a business or get an education, which 
may raise their chances of climbing out of poverty. Whether they want to invest in a 
business opportunity or increase the potential of their own human capital, these 
endeavors can require a substantial amount of initial funds. Gathering initial funds is a 
barrier to people who don't have access to financial institutions. Poorer people in 
 4 
developing countries typically have less access to loans because they do not have the 
necessary collateral to put up for a loan from a bank. Another problem facing a poor 
individual is that the bank’s cost of monitoring and screening a poor borrower is too high 
for it to be a profitable loan for the bank (Hermes and Lensink 2007).   
Microfinance programs are a useful way to inject funds into the local economies 
of developing countries.  KIVA, which means “unity” in Swahili, is a non-profit 
organization based out of San Francisco that exemplifies the microfinance ideology of a 
“hand up instead of a handout.” The organization collects short biographies on 
individuals or groups from around the world who are looking for a microloan. People 
donate to KIVA and choose which group or person receives their funds. An example is 
Lila, a 43-year-old from Alipurduar, India, who needs $475 to help her buy a cow so she 
can produce milk, butter and other products to sell.  At some point the borrower repays 
the money and the donor picks another person to whom to lend. The program started in 
2005 and so far has spread to 82 countries and lent out $938.3 million with a 97 percent 
repayment rate.
3
 Their goal is to help one person in a community, for example, start a 
business, which will have a ripple effect of positive impacts on other people in that 
community. 
Numerous models exist for microfinance programs. One of the most prevalent 
models is group-based lending. The Grameen Bank, in Bangladesh, has a system where 
five people form a group and each receives a loan. If one member of the group defaults 
on their personal loan, the whole group will no longer be eligible for loans (Khandker and 
Pitt 1998). The Thai Village Fund program operates similarly. Funds are given to a 
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village committee that then lends money to village members.  Receiving funds for the 
credit program in subsequent years is dependent on the village’s successful repayment of 
the members’ loans (Kaboski and Townsend 2011). Group-based credit programs 
incentivize people to monitor and assist other members in the group instead of using 
collateral as most bank loan models do. Group-based lending is especially useful for poor 
households that would not have collateral to get a loan (Khandker and Pitt 1998). 
 Although KIVA and other programs boast the positive impacts of microloans, 
there is a substantial amount of research about whether micro lending is an effective 
development tool. Gaonkar and Henriques (2011) find that poor people are more likely to 
use a micro loan for productive and income-generating activities than wealthier 
individuals. This evidence suggests that micro lending is a positive development tool. 
However, there is controversy over the effectiveness of microloans. Ahlin and Jiang 
(2008) state the theoretical framework for microfinance success hinges on the rate at 
which self-employed microfinance participants “graduate” from small-scale operations to 
full-scale. They find that although loans do tend to lower inequality and poverty, in the 
long run, they can either raise or lower GDP.   
A wide area of study looks at microloans given to low–income households. 
Evidence from Bangladesh suggests that access to microloans have substantial positive 
effects for the poorest people (Khandker 2005).  Using data from 1991/92 and 1998/99 in 
Bangladesh, Khandker (2005) finds microfinance accounts for about half of the 3-
percentage-point annual reduction in poverty among program participants.  Studies of 
government microfinance programs in Thailand show the effects of a microloan program 
on expenditure and incomes are quite large for low-income households. Most borrowers 
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were poor and from the agricultural sector (Boonperm et al. 2013). These results support 
the idea that microfinance programs successfully target the poor. Looking at two years of 
panel data of rural households from the Thailand Socioeconomic Survey, Boonperm et al. 
(2013) used a fixed-effects model and found borrowing from the Million Baht Village 
Fund is associated with a 3.5 percent increase in current spending and 1.4 percent more 
income. Using nationwide data from 2004, Boonperm et al. (2013) found similar results 
using a propensity score matching model and additionally found that Village Fund loans 
are associated with purchasing of more durable goods. 
The real effects of microloans are unclear. Evaluating the impacts of a 
microfinance program started in 2006 in Morocco, researchers find that microcredit is a 
valuable financial instrument for the poor, but self-employment investments do not result 
in an exit from poverty within two years of receiving the loan (Crepon et al. 2015). 
Similarly, a randomized control trial in Ethiopia between 2003 and 2006 found that three 
years after the implementation of a microfinance program the fraction of households with 
loans increased 25 percentage points when compared to control areas (Desai et al. 2015). 
Despite this significant increase in the number of households receiving loans, there was 
no clear evidence of widespread improvement in socioeconomic indicators, such as 
income-generating activities, livestock ownership or schooling. The influx in borrowing 
was not associated with more non-farm business creation.  
Most of the current studies of microfinance programs focus on the impacts the 
programs have on economic outcomes like income, consumption and GDP (Ahlin and 
Jiang 2008; Banerjee et al. 2015; Boonperm et al. 2013). To decide if microfinance 
programs are effective development tools, it is important to look at other dimensions of 
 7 
development, like subjective well-being, empowerment and fertility. This research will 
focus on fertility. 
 
2.2 Fertility and Development 
Fertility rates are seen as a key indicator for a country’s development level. As a 
country develops, its fertility rates tend to decrease. Several factors of development can 
impact fertility and result in this negative correlation between development and fertility 
rates. More developed countries compared to less developed ones have better and more 
access to health care. More accessible health care lowers infant mortality rates (Gruber et 
al. 2014). If a family expects more of their children to survive, they might have fewer 
children, lowering fertility rates in a country.   
Another possibility is that a developing country moves away from agricultural 
economies to a more industrialized economy. This can affect fertility in two ways. One 
being the availability of industry jobs might increase the opportunity costs of staying at 
home and bearing children. The other way is that families that focus on agricultural work 
might choose to have more children so they have more help on the farm. If they move 
away from agriculture, they might have fewer children because they do not need as much 
help with labor in the home. Cross-sectional evidence from Egypt supports this 
hypothesis by looking at a farmer’s land share of specific crops and resulting fertility 
changes (Levy 1985). Cotton is a crop that has a high demand for child labor, and Levy 
(1985) finds a 10 percent increase in cotton’s land share results in a 1.5 percent increase 
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in fertility. These findings suggest that the usefulness of children as laborers directly 
influences a farming household’s fertility decisions. 
As a country develops, its populace might decide to invest in their human capital 
by getting an education. If a woman has to choose between going to school and having a 
child, she might decide to delay childbearing.  With the assumption that lower infant 
mortality rates, industrialization, and increased education are all characteristics of a 
developing country, I have shown how fertility can also be viewed as an indicator for a 
country’s development. This suggests that developing countries might have a goal of 
lower fertility rates. But, issues can arise if a country’s fertility rates drop too low. 
2.3 Fertility in Thailand 
In the early 1960s, Thailand reached a total fertility rate of about 6.5 births per 
woman. High fertility was encouraged by government policy, which provided incentives 
for early marriage and bonuses for large families (Mithranon and Prachuabmoh 2003). 
Around the same time, governments and policy planners became concerned with the 
consequences rapid population growth due to high fertility would have on economic 
development. As a result, the Thai government formulated strategies to combat these 
fears. By the 1970s, government concerns about high population growth resulted in the 
implementation of an official population policy and the National Family Planning 
Program, which provided contraception and other services, aimed at lowering fertility 
and population growth. 
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Figure 1 
 
Fertility declined steadily. According to the World Bank,
4
 by 2010, total fertility 
rates in Thailand had dropped to about 1.5 births per woman, with slight variation among 
the regions within Thailand. This fertility rate is below the replacement level, which is 
generally accepted to be about 2.1 children per woman. Thailand’s decline in fertility 
rates is one of the quickest among newly industrializing Asian economies (Mithranon and 
Prachuabmoh 2003). With such a low fertility rate, Thailand faces new challenges and 
concerns regarding population policy, such as an aging population and impending labor 
shortages. 
                                                 
4 http://data.worldbank.org/ 
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2.4 Microfinance Programs and Fertility 
With low fertility issues, it is important to understand how a microfinance 
program might affect the number of children a household decides to have.  The key 
behind how this microfinance program will impact fertility is whether children are 
normal or inferior goods.
5
 As income increases, consumption of normal goods increases. 
The amount consumed of an inferior good decreases as income increases. So, if 
household income increases and the household consequently has more children, then 
children are a normal good.   
An increase in credit increases the value of a woman’s time. Increased value of 
time can result in positive or negative changes in the demand for children. The income 
effect applies when the increase in income causes an increase in demand for children, 
assuming the cost of having children remains constant. On the other hand, the increased 
value of a woman’s time increases the opportunity cost of having a child and results in 
the substitution effect (Pitt 1999). 
Research shows that, generally, there is a negative correlation between income 
and family size (Lindo 2010).  These findings suggest that children are inferior goods and 
that as households make more money they substitute away from having children. Figure 2 
supports this idea by showing women in higher-income countries have fewer children. 
                                                 
5
 I am using specific economic language when referring to children as normal or inferior goods and 
observing how the number of children changes with an income shock. 
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Figure 2 
 
These results are inconsistent with the assumption of consumer choice theory 
models, which suggest children are normal goods because as households make more 
money they can afford the costs associated with more children (Lindo 2010).  There are 
deeper underlying issues aside from solely the costs associated with having children that 
make this consumer choice theory model a poor representation of child-bearing decisions. 
For example, as income level rises, people may become more concerned with the quality 
rather than quantity of children. 
Developed countries, which usually have higher income levels, tend to have a 
lower fertility rate than developing countries (Figure 2), suggesting that fertility reduction 
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might be a desired goal for development policies, such as a microfinance program 
(Kuchler 2012).  There are several ways a microfinance program could impact fertility 
decisions.   
One example is increasing the opportunity costs for women to have children. The 
economic theory of fertility suggests if you increase access to credit, you increase 
opportunities for women and therefore their time becomes more valuable (Kuchler 2012).  
When a woman has access to credit and can get a loan to start a new business or invest in 
something, with every child she decides to have, she is forgoing the potential job 
opportunities. Forgone opportunities increase the opportunity costs of having children 
and theoretically should decrease fertility as women choose to pursue other options. This 
inverse relationship between opportunity costs and demand for children is seen in several 
studies of the relationship between education and fertility (Long and Osili 2008; Kim 
2010). Long and Osili (2008) find that using grant funds to increase a female’s education 
by one year reduces the fertility rates of young women in Nigeria by raising the 
opportunity costs of child bearing  for young women. Kim (2010) points out that this 
inverse relationship between education and fertility could be due to the fact that women 
with higher educations have a better ability to adapt quickly to new contraceptive 
technology. There is a link between education and ability to utilize new contraceptive 
technology. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that an added year of high school-level education 
could cause the impacts Long and Osili (2008) found in Nigeria if increased opportunity 
costs are not also responsible for the change. 
Pitt (1999) suggests a model of demand for children with the presence of 
microfinance programs. His theory states that the degree to which the demand for 
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children is influenced by microfinance participation is directly dependent on the type of 
self-employment opportunities available. If there are opportunities that are not labor 
intensive and allow women to work at or near home, then the income effect is likely to be 
dominant and demand for children would increase. But, if child-bearing and self-
employment opportunities are not compatible, then the substitution effect would 
dominate and people would decide to work instead of having more children (Pitt 1999). 
In Bangladesh, Pitt found fertility increases with the degree of female participation, but 
fertility fell with male participation in microfinance programs. His explanation for these 
results is that the women were able to work in the home or near the home and the income 
effect was dominant. Pitt suggests fertility fell with male participation due to social 
development programs, including encouragement within the Grameen Bank to keep 
families small (Pitt 1999). 
Amin et al. (1995) studied three microfinance programs in Bangladesh, including 
the Grameen Bank, and found alternative results. Using a 1992 national household 
sample, the researchers found that poor female recipients of microloans who were 
engaged in income-generating activities experienced a decreased level of fertility, 
decrease in desire for more children and increase in contraceptive use. Although, these 
results show a decrease in fertility, it supports Pitt’s (1999) idea that the opportunities 
available to a woman are going to determine the change in fertility.  
Lindo (2010) found supporting results with panel data from the United States 
using a logit model and a linear probability model. The results show that a family reacts 
to an income shock, in the form of a husband's job loss, by having more children in the 
timeframe immediately after the shock.  There are two possible explanations for this. In a 
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dynamic fertility model, credit-constrained households have an incentive to delay having 
a child until the husband earns more. When they lose their job, and the earnings trajectory 
is significantly reduced, households have less of an incentive to delay having children 
(Lindo 2010). Another explanation is that a husband losing his job might be seen as a 
convenient opportunity to have a child because they have more free time to allocate to the 
task of raising a child (Lindo 2010). This supports Pitt's findings of the relationship 
between male participation and fertility. 
Thailand is a unique case. Women in Thailand are significantly more involved in 
major decision making and controlling household assets and finances than women in 
other developing countries. They also seem to have higher ambitions for career 
advancement (Mithranon and Prachuabmoh 2003).  The unusual paradigm in Thailand, 
might suggest that women in Thailand are exceptionally vulnerable to the increases in 
opportunity costs due to a microfinance program. But, as Pitt (1999) suggested, if the 
informal economy is large in Thailand, it is possible the income effect will take over and 
women will choose to have more children. 
2.5 Contribution to Existing Literature 
The current research has some weaknesses where my study uses a longer panel 
and a different method that might offer more reliable results. Kuchler (2012) argues that 
his research is one of the first to utilize a panel dataset to look at this question and uses 
two years of panel data.  Similarly, Boonperm et al. (2013) uses two years of panel data 
to study how microfinance programs change income and spending in Thailand. Panel 
data helps overcome the self-selection biases that plague nearly all microfinance 
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programs. This self-selection bias stems from the nature of microfinance programs. 
People choose to take out a loan rather than getting randomly assigned to a loan. Self-
selection creates a bias because there might be certain characteristics about a person that 
makes them more likely to participate in a microfinance program and it is possible those 
characteristics could also impact key variables. Panel data sets allow researchers to 
employ useful econometric tools, like difference-in-differences and fixed effects to 
remove or reduce the bias (Tedeschi 2008). By using 11 years of panel data, my study of 
Thailand may be able to report impacts that Kuchler's (2012) study in Bangladesh and 
Boonperm et al. (2013) missed with more limited data. Another weakness of the data 
used by Boonperm et al. (2013) is the absence of pre-program data. To fully understand 
the impacts of the program, it is beneficial to have information before and after the 
implementation of the microfinance program. This allows you to use the pre-program 
years as a base and compare them with the post-program years to identify the impacts of 
the program. The data I am using covers five years before the program and six years after 
the program.  
Kuchler's (2012) study uses an eligibility requirement within the microfinance 
program that allows participation only from those who own less than 1/2 acre of land.  
Kuchler argues that a comparison among villages that did and did not participate could 
cause differences in results because of non-random program placement. For example, a 
microfinance program might be more likely in poor or rural communities. A fixed effects 
and difference-in-difference model compares the differences between eligible households 
(less than ½ acre of land) and ineligible households (more than ½ acre of land) with the 
differences between eligible and ineligible households in nonparticipating villages. He 
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finds that access to a microfinance programs does not have a significant impact on 
fertility, but finds fertility decreases with degree of participation, which could point to 
impacts in the long run (Kuchler 2012).  
Kuchler (2012) cites two working papers that outline an important distinction in 
microfinance literature. Many microfinance programs include contraceptive knowledge 
and dispersion. Borrowers from the Grameen Bank have to recite the “sixteen decisions” 
at every meeting; one being “we shall plan to keep our family small” (Kuchler 2012). 
Buttenheim (2006) studies the relationship between microfinance programs and 
contraceptive use. The study in Indonesia finds higher contraceptive use in areas exposed 
to microfinance, but actually borrowing from the program does not have an impact. In a 
related study, Sukontamarn (2006) finds the presence of the Grameen Bank in the village 
of the observed individual is associated with lower fertility and lower desired number of 
children. These results suggest that there is an important distinction between access to a 
microfinance program and participation in the program. 
The scope of the Thai Million Baht Village Fund and the strength of an 
instrumental variable will allow me to fill a gap in the literature and possibly find results 
different from Kuchler's (2012) findings. Lindo (2010) found that the best way to 
understand the causal impact of a family’s income on fertility would be to create an 
experiment where a household is randomly assigned to an income level. In the absence of 
such experiments, the next best alternative is to find something that randomly adds or 
takes away from a household’s income. The sudden implementation of the Village Fund 
and its quasi-experimental nature allows me to look at it as an income shock. 
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3 Thailand 
 Thailand is a country located in Southeast Asia. Formerly known as Siam until 
1939, Thailand is the only country in Southeast Asia to never be colonized by a European 
power. Its total area is roughly 198,000 square miles and has a population around 68 
million people.
 6 
Figure 3 
 
                                                 
6
 Information about the history and economy of Thailand taken from the CIA World Factbook  
(https://www.cia.gov) 
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 Thailand’s main industries include tourism, textiles and agriculture. Thirty-two 
percent of the labor force’s occupation is agricultural. Thailand is currently experiencing 
a labor shortage and has the fourth lowest unemployment rate in the world at 0.9 percent. 
This may amplify the importance of identifying the impacts of increased microfinance on 
fertility rates, because decreases in fertility rates will contribute to exacerbating 
Thailand’s labor shortage. 
Thailand is controlled by a constitutional monarchy. In November 2000, the Thai 
Parliament was dissolved and by January 2001 the new Prime Minister, Thaksin 
Shinawatra, was in control (Kaboski and Townsend 2012). While running for Prime 
Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra promised government programs aimed at helping the 
people of Thailand. Some of the programs he planned to implement were affordable 
health care, a microfinance program and a debt moratorium for farmers. Many Thai 
people did not believe these programs would come to fruition, and surprised the Thai 
citizen when it was actually implemented.  The rapid arrival of the program contributed 
to the unexpected nature of the microfinance program and gave it a quasi-experimental 
quality because people did not have time to alter their decisions in anticipation of these 
programs.  Shortly after Thaksin’s election, the microfinance program was started and the 
funds were distributed to the villages between 2001 and 2002.  
 3.1 Million Baht Village Fund 
In 2001, Thailand implemented a microfinance program that provided funds to 
every village to create community-level lending organizations. The goal of the program 
was to create a way for communities to have a self-sustaining fund that would aid in 
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occupational development and income-generating activities. This program, Thailand’s 
Million Baht Village Fund, is among the largest microfinance programs in the world. The 
program distributed approximately $1.8 billion in initial funds, about 1.5 percent of 
Thailand's GDP for 2001. This influx of funds was distributed to 77,000 Thai villages; 
each received roughly $25,000 (Kaboski and Townsend 2012).  Two features of the 
Million Baht Village Fund gave the influx of funds a degree of exogeniety. 
 One of the key features of the Thai Village Fund is the surprise onset. People did 
not have time to alter their decision-making in anticipation of the program; therefore, we 
can assume that we can capture the impacts of the Village Fund after its implementation. 
An example of how this works is that if the population of a country anticipates a huge 
influx of credit in the next few years, they may alter their decisions leading up to the 
programs implementation. Altered decision-making before the official introduction of the 
program would make it difficult to identify the true impacts of the program because the 
impacts would not be seen when comparing pre-program and post-program years. 
Additionally, a comparison of before and after people knew about it would be necessary. 
The second is the wide variation in the concentration of credit injection among villages 
because each village received the same amount regardless of village size. Smaller 
villages had relatively stronger injections of credit than larger villages. Variation in 
relative injection strength acts as a natural way to identify the amount of credit received 
in each village. 
To receive the funds, villages had to form committees and submit applications. 
Committee members were selected democratically with some regulations in place for 
fairness.  The regulations required that 75 percent of village members be present at the 
 20 
meeting to select committee members, half of the members had to be women, and 
members must be over 20 years old and have lived in the village for at least two years. 
They could not be bankrupt or previously imprisoned, and each member could only serve 
on the committee for two years (Kaboski and Townsend 2012). 
The funds were given to the villages with a few ultimatums. The government told 
villages that if they mismanaged the funds or the village institutions failed, they would 
not be given any more funds and other sources of government funding would be cut off. 
Villages that did particularly well were promised additional funds. In 2005, funds with 
the highest rating were granted an additional 100,000 baht ($2,500 US) (De La Huerta 
Barradas 2011). 
The villages received sample Village Fund regulations, which gave them idea of 
how to structure their lending program. While some villages decided to use the sample 
structure, other villages misunderstood this to be a requirement, which resulted in many 
of the funds being very similar. The fund usually allotted 900,000 baht ($22,500 US) for 
regular lending and set aside 100,000 baht ($2,500 US)  for emergency lending (Kaboski 
and Townsend 2012).  Loans could not exceed 20,000 baht ($500 US) without special 
approval from all members of the fund. The repayment period for the loan could not be 
longer than 12 months, with the emergency loans typically being shorter. They had to 
charge a positive interest rate, but the Village Fund committee could set a standard rate, 
on average 7 percent (Kaboski and Townsend 2012). 
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3.2 Kaboski and Townsend 
Kaboski and Townsend (2012) used panel data to determine how the Thai micro-
finance program affected consumption in local villages. Their research supported the 
buffer stock savings model, which suggests that people save more, in the form of liquid 
assets, in credit-constrained environments. They found that when credit constraints were 
alleviated, consumption increased. Consumption specifically increased for household and 
automotive repairs, meat and alcohol. Kaboski and Townsend (2011) use a structural 
evaluation of the Thai Million Baht Village Fund and found similar results to their 2012 
study. Although their research was thorough and evaluated impacts of credit on most 
aspects of a village economy, they did not look at how it changed fertility in the villages.  
Because each village in the Thai Million Baht Village Fund received the same 
amount of funds from the program, smaller villages received a proportionally larger 
injection of funds.  Following Kaboski and Townsend (2012), using the inverse of village 
population will provide me with a source of exogenous variation in access to credit. The 
rapid implementation of the program meant that people did not know that the funds were 
going to be available to them. This allows me to look at the loans as a sort of income 
shock. Since there are factors within a household that are likely to influence both fertility 
and income, this income shock via increased access to credit provided a degree of 
exogeneity (Lindo 2010). The gaps in methodology within the literature on microfinance 
programs and fertility along with a lack of analysis in Thailand create an opening for my 
research to extend Kaboski and Townsend’s (2012) research to fertility. 
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4 Data 
 The Thai Townsend dataset  includes panel survey data of households, institutions 
and village leaders in Thailand.  Robert Townsend created this dataset to find a way to 
track how households and individuals overcome financial challenges.
7
 My research will 
focus on the household surveys from 1997-2007 and will also use parts of the survey of 
village leaders. The unit of observation is the household.  The dataset contains 
information at the individual level, but each individual is recorded under a household ID. 
Because of the way some of the variables were collected, it is necessary to look at the 
variables at the household level rather than the individual level. The household level is 
also essential because the individual level data does not specify fertility information and 
without knowing what children belong to which individual I have to look at the number 
of children in a household.  There is usually a single head in a household, but it is 
common for there to be non-nuclear households. It is impossible to accurately identify 
who is a parent to whom. 
                                                 
7
 https://mitpress.mit.edu/blog/townsend-thai-project 
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Figure 48 
 
 Because Thailand is a diverse country with wide dissimilarities between urban 
and rural areas, surveyors chose two separate regions to use: one relatively urban region 
near Bangkok in central Thailand, and another poorer, less developed region in the 
Northeast. They chose two changwats, or provinces, from each region: Lop Buri and 
Chachoengsao were chosen from the Central region, and Sisaket and Buriram from the 
Northeast. These specific changwats were chosen because each had a county that was 
                                                 
8
 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/th.html 
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also part of the Thai Household Socio-Economic Survey, an annual survey that could be 
used as a comparison.  Twelve tambons, or sub-counties, in each changwat were 
randomly selected using Geographic Information Systems.  Four villages from each 
tambon were randomly selected. There are 192 villages in the baseline survey. To 
perform the surveys, enumerators were hired from Thai universities. The baseline survey 
was the largest and included information from 2,880 households and 192 key informants 
(village leaders).
9
  
                                                 
9
 http://townsend-thai.mit.edu/ 
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Figure 5 10 
 
                                                 
10
 http://townsend-thai.mit.edu/data/Timeline06252012.pdf 
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 The baseline survey was conducted in May 1997, right before the devaluation of 
the Thai baht in July 1997 and the Asian Financial Crisis. The Townsend Thai Project 
saw the Asian Financial Crisis as an opportunity to follow the impact of this economic 
turmoil on households and institutions. In 1998, they randomly chose four of the 12 
tambons to resurvey and one-third of the original participants to resurvey.  The attrition 
rate from year to year was about two percent (Kaboski and Townsend 2012) so, of the 
960 households surveyed annually, 730 were included in the data I am using for all 11 
years (1997-2007). In any panel survey, attrition is an important issue to be aware of. 
Results can change if certain types of households are leaving the survey. If the leaving 
households are randomly selected, it would not be an issue. But, it is possible that there 
are certain qualities and characteristics that make a household more likely than others to 
leave the annual survey. For the purpose of this research I assume that the households 
that left the survey were random. For further research, it would be useful to identify any 
similarities between households that left the survey. 
 This panel dataset has many strengths, including the detail of the survey and the 
time period it spans. Along with taking place during a time of economic change, the data 
also catches the impacts of the 2001 Thai Million Baht Village Fund, which sent an 
influx of credit into village economies.  
 
 27 
Figure 6 
 
 
As seen in Figure 6, the average amount borrowed from the Village Fund 
increases drastically after the program’s implementation in 2001, and continues to 
gradually increase in the years after. Table 1 shows that along with more money being 
borrowed from the Village Fund, more households are borrowing from that source. In 
2001, eight households had a loan from the village fund. By 2002, 448 households had a 
Village Fund loan. This sharp influx of cash further supports the quasi-experimental 
nature of the Thai Million Baht Village Fund due to its rapid onset. After 2001, Figure 7 
indicates that households started to get more loans. The number of households with zero 
to two loans decreased and the number of households with more than two loans 
 28 
increased. Figure 6 shows that although the Village Fund is not the main source of loans, 
it makes up a significant proportion of the money borrowed in Thailand. This combined 
with the visible impacts of the Village Fund in Table 1 and Figure 7 suggests it should 
have significant impacts in my analysis.  
 
Table 1 
Number of Households Receiving Each Loan Type by Year 
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1997 8 47 103 249 6 28 86 6 83 28 2 3 15 73 
1998 5 84 185 242 8 20 98 11 100 66 43 2 12 89 
1999 10 92 250 276 11 28 111 9 138 71 34 2 14 128 
2000 11 66 239 282 11 25 109 4 133 55 29 1 10 161 
2001 8 38 217 289 25 24 106 13 131 49 26 0 15 201 
2002 448 37 188 289 43 22 105 7 117 55 16 0 15 325 
2003 504 27 155 293 51 19 94 4 103 63 14 0 13 342 
2004 490 25 121 293 62 14 103 4 93 85 10 0 15 339 
2005 491 24 89 288 69 12 115 11 63 59 5 1 12 304 
2006 490 21 51 302 78 12 92 7 45 73 8 0 1 270 
2007 470 19 36 299 66 10 91 5 30 45 7 0 8 255 
  
Figure 7 shows the number of households that only have zero, one or two loans 
decreases dramatically. The number of households that have three or more loans 
increases. This change occurs between 2001 and 2002. The same years the Village Fund 
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was introduced, suggesting households took on more loans after the introduction of the 
Village Fund.  These outcomes imply the Village Fund had a significant impact on 
village borrowing. 
Figure 7 
 
 My dependent variable is the number of children aged 0 to 2 in a household.  This 
variable tracks new births in a household.  Most fertility studies use individual fertility 
data and have data on whether a particular woman conceived a child during a certain year 
(Lindo 2010).  Household-level data is not as exact as individual-level data, but it will 
still reveal the impacts of the Village Fund on household fertility. For my right-hand side 
variables, I will be using information on household credit utilization, specifically how 
much was borrowed from the Village Fund, along with how much they borrowed from 
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other sources. Household characteristics such as, number of adult males (>15), number of 
children in age groups 2 to 15, number of women older than 15 and younger than 40, 
number of  women over 40 years old, whether the head’s primary occupation is farming, 
and net income are important right-hand side variables.  For the purpose of this paper, I 
am defining women older than 15 and younger than 40 as women of childbearing age and 
women over the age of 40 as other women. 
(1) 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛼𝑉𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1 ∑  
13
𝑘=1
𝐻𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 + ∑  
6
𝑘=2
𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 In Equation 1, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1 is my left-hand side variable, number of children in 
household i in year t+1. 𝑉𝐹𝑖,𝑡 is the amount household i borrowed from the Village Fund 
in year t.  𝑋𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of the  k household characteristics and 𝐻𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 is a sum of 
household borrowing other than the Village Fund. 
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Table 2 
Variable Description 
LHS Variable Name Variable Label 
Villagefund 
Amount borrowed from Village Fund in 
10,000 baht 
Otherloans 
Amount borrowed from other loan sources 
in 10,000 baht 
Netincome Net income in 10,000 baht 
Yngchild Number of children under 2 years old 
Otherchild Number of other children age 2 to 15 
Women_fert Number of women >15 and <40 years old 
Women_nonfert Number of women >40 years old 
Adultmale Number of males >15 years old 
Headfarm Dummy for farmer head of household 
 
 Theory from existing literature helped me choose which variables to include in 
my model. The number of adult males and women of childbearing age is apparent. If 
there are more people in a household capable of reproducing then they will be more 
babies. The number of older children is also important because the number of existing 
children in a household might impact a household's decision to have an additional child. 
By including other women, I am hoping to capture any possible effects grandparents or 
other potential caregivers might have. My hypothesis is that a household with more 
women over 40 could have more babies because these other women in the household 
might be able to take some of the burden of childcare. Childcare help might influence a 
household's decision making. Whether the head of the household is a farmer or not is 
included in many similar studies (Kaboski and Townsend 2012) because farming families 
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might have different child preferences from non-farming families. Table 3 shows 
descriptive statistics of the key variables. 
 
Table 3 
 
      
 Mean Std Dev Min Max Count 
Babies 0.11 0.32 0.00 3.00 7280 
Net Income 10.50 20.02 -85.40 626.80 7280 
Other Loan Sources 9.34 21.18 0.00 523.20 7280 
Village Fund 0.95 1.71 0.00 26.00 7280 
Farmer Head 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 7280 
Other Children 1.20 1.09 0.00 7.00 7280 
Women >40 0.91 0.52 0.00 3.00 7280 
Women <40 (>15) 0.76 0.73 0.00 5.00 7280 
Adult Males 1.54 0.93 0.00 8.00 7280 
Note. N= 7280 households. 
 
  In Table 3 and Table 5 the net income, other loan sources and Village Fund 
variables are measured in 10,000 Thai baht.  For the time period, 40 baht was about 1 US 
dollar. So, the mean net income was about $2,600 (US dollars).  Farmer head is a dummy 
variable that indicates whether the head’s primary occupation was farming. This is an 
important household characteristic to include. Theoretically, households that farm might 
make different child-bearing decisions than households that do not farm. A farming 
household might choose to have more children so they can have extra help with farming 
duties. 
 The household credit utilization variables will also be important for my analysis. 
There are many different borrowing sources in the data, but for my analysis I grouped 
them into Village Fund and Other Loan Sources. The Village Fund is the main variable I 
am interested in; therefore, I decided to group the others together. Although they are 
Summary Statistics: Key Variables 
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grouped together, it is important to understand what other borrowing sources are 
available. The largest lending source is the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Co-
operatives (BAAC), which is a government-owned bank that provides affordable credit 
for agricultural producers. One of the smaller sources, the Production Credit Group 
(PGC), is a community-level organization that helps promote good saving habits and 
issues small loans to the local community. My study focuses on money borrowed from 
the Village Fund, and including all of the sources a person borrows from is important 
because the amount they borrow from one source might impact the amount they borrow 
from another.  
 
Table 4 
Summary Statistics- Borrowing Characteristics 
      
 Mean Std Dev Min Max  
Village Fund 9,523.49 17,141.42 0 260,000  
BAAC 34,909.68 84,363.60 0 1,360,000  
Neighbor 1,395.95 10,018.84 0 245,000  
Relative 7,554.43 36,326.86 0 870,000  
PCG 544.37 5,195.58 0 300,000  
Commercial Bank 6,451.92 64,790.74 0 3,000,000  
Agricultural Coop 7,234.09 29,122.97 0 1,000,000  
Rice Bank 31.91 712.99 0 40,000  
Money Lender 6,132.79 31,574.72 0 880,000  
Store Owner 7,439.36 59,149.36 0 2,112,000  
Supplier 2,250.89 59,042.28 0 4,700,000  
Landlord 56.76 2,125.26 0 100,000  
Purchaser 2,434.29 34,575.82 0 1,100,000  
Other 16,944.19 107,877.14 0 4,600,000  
Notes. The loan amounts are measure in 1 baht. N= 7280 households 
 
 Due to the way the data was collected, I can only look at it at the household level 
when looking at fertility. To be able to work with the data, I had to collapse the data to 
the household level. So, the borrowing variables will tell me how much a household 
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borrowed from a loan source, but not which member borrowed the money. This is an 
unfortunate but necessary loss of data. 
 Table 5 and Table 6 display the summary statistics of Village Fund borrowers and 
non-Village Fund borrowers.  Some variable means are very similar: babies, women of 
childbearing age, adult males, other children.  The means with the biggest difference are 
net income and other funds. The mean net income for Village Fund borrowers was 11.57 
(in 10,000 baht) and 9.95 (in 10,000 baht) for non-Village Fund borrowers.  This shows 
that households that borrowed from the Village Fund, on average, had 16,200 more baht 
in net income ($405 US).  The amount borrowed from other funds was also substantially 
larger for Village Fund borrowers. On average, households that borrowed from the 
Village Fund borrowed 53,100 more baht ($1,327 US) than households that did not 
borrow from the Village Fund. This difference supports the idea that households that 
borrow from other sources are more likely to also borrow from the Village Fund. There 
are 421 households that only borrowed from the Village Fund. 
Table 5 
Summary Statistics: Village Fund Borrowers 
      
 Mean Std Dev Min Max  
Babies 0.11 0.32 0.00 2.00  
Net Income 11.57 18.36 -41.67 354.74  
Other Funds 12.85 26.99 0.00 523.20  
Village Fund 2.81 1.86 0.05 26.00  
Farmer Head 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00  
Other Children 1.21 1.08 0.00 6.00  
Women >40 0.97 0.50 0.00 3.00  
Women <40 (>15) 0.72 0.72 0.00 4.00  
Adult Males 1.55 0.84 0.00 6.00  
Note. Net income, other funds and Village Fund measured in 10,000 baht. N= 2495 
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Table 6 
Summary Statistics: Not Village Fund Borrowers 
      
 Mean Std Dev Min Max  
Babies 0.11 0.33 0.00 3.00  
Net Income 9.95 20.80 -85.40 626.80  
Other Funds 7.54 17.20 0.00 316.20  
Village Fund 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Farmer Head 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00  
Other Children 1.19 1.09 0.00 7.00  
Women >40 0.88 0.52 0.00 3.00  
Women <40 (>15) 0.79 0.74 0.00 5.00  
Adult Males 1.54 0.97 0.00 8.00  
Note. Net income, other funds and Village Fund measured in 10,000 baht. N= 4815  
 The other data I will use comes from a survey of village leaders. The important 
variable I will include from this dataset is the number of households in each village for a 
year. The mean number of households in a village is 170 with a standard deviation of 300 
households. This variable will be crucial for my instrumental variable technique. 
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Figure 8 
 
 A quick look into the data shows that the average size of a household is changing. 
In Figure 8, it is evident that around 2000-2001, households started to get smaller. Using 
the available data, I should be able to determine if this decrease is due to reduced fertility, 
and whether this reduction in household size is a result of the sudden increase in available 
credit. When attempting to identify causation, it is important to be aware of the 
possibility of spurious results. A spurious relationship exists if available credit and 
household size appear to have a linear correlation, but there is a lurking variable that 
causes the two to decline and appear as if correlated. 
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Figure 9 
 
 
 Figure 9 shows families with a Village Fund loan on average have more babies 
than households with no loans or loans from other sources. However, other factors are not 
controlled for, so there might be other aspects influencing these results. All of the lines 
converge around 2006. 
 
5 Methods 
My methodological approach is taken from Kaboski and Townsend (2012), which 
is the leading paper on the impacts of the Thai Million Baht Village Fund. A researcher 
should use fixed-effects models to control for variation and some aspects of self-
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selection. This model controls for unobserved heterogeneity that is constant across time 
by using differencing, for example taking a first difference, which will remove time-
invariant components of the model. In this case, there are many household characteristics 
that will also impact a household's specific fertility decisions.  The Hausman test, 
confirmed a fixed-effects model is the appropriate model to use rather than a random-
effects model (X
2
= 74.63, p< 0.001). Some advantages of a random-effects model are 
more degrees of freedom and you can estimate coefficients for explanatory variables that 
are constant over time, but in this instance, a random-effects model was not valid.  
 Using time-specific and household-specific fixed-effects models I can eliminate 
unobserved variables that do not vary over time. Assuming fertility changes over time, 
which initial results support, this should be an appropriate method.  As in Kaboski and 
Townsend (2012), Equation (2) is the specification for the impact of Village Fund credit 
(VFi,t) of household i at time t on the outcome measure for fertility, yi,t+1. 
(2) 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛼𝑉𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1 ∑  
13
𝑘=1
𝐻𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 + ∑  
6
𝑘=2
𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
  
                                                                                                                                                     
 VFi,t measures how much household i borrowed from the Village Fund during year t.  X 
is a set of six household characteristics control variables.  H is total borrowing from 13 
other funds. There are also the time-specific fixed-effects (𝜑𝑡) and a household-specific 
fixed-effect (𝜑𝑖 ).  I chose to lead the dependent variable because it will take a minimum 
of nine months to observe a child in the dataset. Assuming a child is the result of a loan, 
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the loan occurs in year 1 while the child appears in year 2. Kaboski and Townsend (2012) 
run multiple regressions, some with the lagged value of the Village Fund credit and 
others using the current Village Fund credit. Because they are looking at consumption 
and income, they do not have this biological nine-month delay to account for. 
5.1 Instrumental Variable 
  Researchers use instrumental variables to solve the problem of endogenous 
regressors, when explanatory variables are correlated with the error term. In this 
situation, OLS will provide inconsistent estimators. Instrumental variables provide a way 
to obtain consistent parameter estimates. This instrumental technique was used by 
Kaboski and Townsend (2012).  The instrument is the interaction of the inverse number 
of households in the village and the post-program year dummies. Kaboski and Townsend 
(2012) argue that program year and the number of households in a village are exogenous. 
The number of households in a village is not connected to the number of babies, but the 
number of households in a village will be connected to the amount of credit available to 
each household in the Village Fund. The researchers restrict their research to villages 
with 50 to 250 households and argue that the most important variation comes from these 
small villages, but they also find their results are robust to including larger or smaller 
villages. They find that the microfinance injections averaged 27 percent of income in the 
smallest villages and less than 2.5 percent in the largest villages (Kaboski and Townsend 
2012). The researchers do not clarify why they restricted their research to these sizes, 
which excluded 9 of the 64 villages in the survey. In 2002, the number of households in 
the excluded villages were: 30, 34, 268, 297, 305, 314, 400, 900 and 3194. Because 
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Kaboski and Towsend’s (2012) results were robust to including all the villages I am using 
all the available villages. 
The instrumental variable of inverse village size affects the Village Fund credit 
because it changes how much credit a household has access to. The instrumental variable 
is necessary because the Village Fund was not randomly assigned or distributed. But, the 
number of households in a village should not have an independent effect on individual 
household fertility. If my assumptions are correct, this is a valid instrumental variable. 
 
Figure 10 
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 Kaboski and Townsend (2012) use a two-stage least squares approach. By using 
the interaction between the inverse number of households in the village and a dummy of 
post-program year, it controls for variations across households correlated with the inverse 
of village size and uses the additional effect of inverse number of households as the 
instrument (Townsend and Kaboski 2012). One potential problem is that the number of 
young children in a household might be correlated with the instrumental variable. The 
reason I see a potential issue is that if a household has a child and then that might cause 
part of the household to break off and form a new household. I anticipate the potential 
increase in the number of households in a village due to having a child is minimal and 
does not have a substantial impact on the validity of my instrumental variable. Figure 10 
shows that there are not any significant changes in the average number of households in a 
village. Since it stays fairly constant, I assume that this will not impact my instrumental 
variable. This instrumental variable technique combined with the quasi-experimental 
nature of the Thai Million Baht Village Fund and a panel dataset will allow me to make a 
new contribution to the existing literature. 
 
6 Results 
 This section discusses estimation results for the impact of a microfinance program 
on number of young children a household has. Table 7 present the results of the various 
models used for my estimation process with the IV model in column 3 being the most 
relevant results. 
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Table 7 
Model Results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable = 
Babies 
OLS OLS FE IV FE 
 
Village Fund 
 
0.00013 
 
-0.00238 
 
-0.01605
**
 
 [0.00334] [0.00393] [0.00764] 
Net Income -0.00003 0.00014 0.00018 
 [0.00021] [0.00054] [0.00026] 
Other Children -0.012
***
 -0.064
***
 -0.064
***
 
 [0.004] [0.007] [0.005] 
Other Loan Sources -0.00030
*
 0.00001 0.00006 
 [0.00018] [0.00022] [0.00026] 
Women >40 0.021
**
 0.017 0.020 
 [0.009] [0.015] [0.014] 
Women <40 (>15) 0.067
***
 0.040
***
 0.039
***
 
 [0.007] [0.011] [0.008] 
Farmer Head 0.008 -0.017 -0.017 
 [0.010] [0.013] [0.011] 
Adult Males 0.022
***
 0.015
**
 0.016
**
 
 [0.005] [0.007] [0.007] 
Constant 0.017 0.136
***
 0.131
***
 
 [0.017] [0.030] [0.022] 
Year Fixed Effects 
 
Household Fixed Effect 
Yes 
 
No 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Number obs. 7280 7280 7280 
R
2 
Squared Correlation 
0.03 0.03 
 
 
0.201 
Notes.Coefficients are reported with standard errors in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Variables net income, Village Fund and other loan sources are measured in 
10,000 Baht. Robust standard errors clustered on village ID for model 1 and model 2. Squared correlation 
is the squared correlations between the left-hand side variable and predicted value. 
 
Model 1 is a simple OLS regression. In the OLS regression the R
2
 is 0.03 and 
Village Fund is not significant. Because there are certain characteristics about a 
household that makes them more or less likely to get a loan or have more children, an 
OLS regression will be affected by this omitted variable bias and have potential 
inconsistent results.   
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To address this issue, I need to use fixed or random effects. The Hausman test 
uses the differences in the coefficients of fixed effects and random effects model to 
decide if a random effects is the appropriate model to use. I reject the random effects 
specification (X
2
 =26.08, p =0.037), so apply fixed effects. I added in household fixed 
effects in Model 2.  Fixed effects control for these unseen household characteristics that 
do not change over time. The Village Fund coefficient is still insignificant, but now it is 
negative.  
It is important to include household fixed effects, but this does not solve the 
endogeneity problem. There could be certain characteristics about a household that makes 
them more likely to participate in the Village Fund program.  To correct for this, I use an 
instrumental variable, which helps give the Village Fund a degree of exogeneity.  Model 
3 is a combination of fixed effects and an instrumental variable. This model provides the 
most reliable results. 
The first stage results (Table 8) are useful for determining whether instrumental 
variable approach is valid. The regression performs a weak identification test where the 
H0 is the equation is weakly identified. With an F-statistic of 295.38 and a 5% relative 
bias critical value of 18.37, I can reject that the max bias in 5% due to a weak instrument. 
This means the maximum bias from a weak instrument is less than 5%. 
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Table 8 
IV Regression --- First Stage 
 
Village Fund Coef. 
IV 2002 72.474*** 
 [7.162] 
IV 2003 146.399*** 
 [7.515] 
IV 2004 169.490*** 
 [8.313] 
IV 2005 204.990*** 
 [8.188] 
IV 2006 197.542*** 
 [7.383] 
Net Income 0.002*** 
 [0.0009] 
Other Children 0.017 
 [0.019] 
Other Loan Sources 0.004*** 
 [0.0009] 
Farmer Head 0.093** 
 [0.037] 
Women >40 0.224*** 
 [0.046] 
Women <40 (>15) 0.011 
 [0.026] 
Adult Males 0.073** 
 [0.022] 
  
Year Dummies YES 
 
 
Cragg- Donald Wald F statistic                295.38 
 
5% relative bias                                         18.37 
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 Some of the results from Model 3 (Table 7) were unexpected.  Contrary to what I 
expected, net income was not statistically significant.  To interpret the variable, it is 
important to remember that it is measure in 10,000 baht. When changed into dollars, this 
result shows that for every 100,000,000 baht ($2.5 million US dollar equivalent) increase 
in net income, on average a family has 1.79 more children. This result is statistically and 
practically insignificant and it is pointless to make any inferences from this result as to 
children being a normal or inferior good. 
 Another result I found surprising was the farmer head coefficient. It is a dummy 
variable indicator for whether the head of the household was a farmer or rancher. 
Theoretically, I expected this result to be positive because the literature supports the idea 
that agricultural families tend to have more children than non-farming families. Along 
with the unexpected sign of this variable, it was also statistically insignificant. Being a 
farmer rather than non-farmer was associated with 0.017 fewer children, all else constant. 
 Some results met my expectations.  The number of other children in the 
household aged 2 to 15 was significant to the 1 percent level. It was a count variable of 
the number of other children in the household, so holding all else constant, for every 
additional child in that age group, a household had  0.06 fewer babies, on average.  
 The number of women of childbearing age and adult males were both significant 
results. The number of women of childbearing age is a count variable of the number of 
women above the age of 15 and under 40 years old. Significant at the 1 percent level, for 
every additional woman of childbearing age in a household, the household had 0.039 
more babies. I would have been concerned with the validity of my model if the result 
would have been negative and insignificant. If there are more women of childbearing age 
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in a household, I expect that household has more babies. Similarly, I expected a positive 
and significant result for the number of adult males in a household.  For every additional 
adult male in a household, the household had .015 more children, on average (significant 
at the 5 percent level). Other women in a household had a positive but not statistically 
significant. An additional woman above 40 years of age in a household was associated 
with a 0.02 baby increase, all else constant. 
 The Village Fund variable was the main variable of interest. It negative and was 
significant to the 5 percent level. This variable is measured in 10,000 baht. For every 
additional 1,000,000 baht borrowed ($25,000 US dollar equivalent) a household had on 
average, an additional 1.60 new children. While this result is statistically significant, it is 
not practically significant because these loans are given in small amounts, typically under 
20,000 baht ($500 US dollar equivalent). The other borrowing sources were not 
statistically or practically significant. I believe this is due to the grouping of the loans 
together. The BAAC is a substantial loan source and might have had significant impacts, 
but when included with insignificant borrowing sources like rice banks and landlords, the 
significance of the larger funds might have been overpowered by the insignificance of the 
other loan sources. I will test a model where BAAC is a separate variable in my 
robustness checks. 
 6.1 Robustness Check 
Checking for robustness is an important way to examine core regression variables. 
In my analysis, the Village Fund variable is my key right-hand side variable and to check 
for robustness I modify my regression by including or excluding other variables. 
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In Table 9, the results for Model 1 show that the Village Fund coefficient is not 
significant. Poisson models are used when the dependent variable is a count and my 
dependent variable is a count of how many babies are in a household. While it was useful 
to run this regression and understand its benefits, it had one main weakness. With the 
instrumental variable Poisson model I could not include household fixed effects. Instead, 
I had to include regional-level fixed effects. Although, there might be reason to believe 
that there are certain characteristics about a region that should be fixed, the loss of the 
household-level fixed effects cannot be ignored. The coefficient is negative for all three 
models, but because we are losing household fixed effects in the Poisson model with an 
instrumental variable we are not efficiently estimating the coefficient.  Model 2 (Table 9) 
excludes households that have a head who identifies their primary occupation to be 
farming. Model 3 keeps households only that have loans only from the Village Fund or 
no loans at all. About 420 of the 1605 observations had a Village Fund loan. Village 
Fund has a much larger constant in Model 2. When the sample was restricted to non-
borrowers and Village Fund borrowers, participating in the Village Fund program had a 
larger impact on number of babies in a household. 
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Table 9 
Robustness Checks 
      (1) (2) (3)  
Dependent Variable = 
Babies 
IV Poisson No Farmers No Loans or only 
VF 
 
     
Village Fund -0.05553 -0.01688
*
 -0.08872
**
  
 [0.06479] [0.00926] [0.04224]  
Net Income -0.00059 -0.00033 0.00022  
 [0.00099] [0.00032] [0.00074]  
Other Children -0.113
***
 -0.05733
***
 -0.03730
***
  
 [0.034] [0.00811] [0.01432]  
Other Loan Sources -0.003 -0.00020   
 [0.002] [0.00045]   
Farmer Head 0.025  -0.01877  
 [0.076]  [0.02461]  
Women >40 0.141
**
 0.00574 0.01276  
 [0.067] [0.01845] [0.03066]  
Women > 40 (>15) 0.511
***
 0.04368
***
 0.07636
***
  
 [0.037] [0.01180] [0.01895]  
Adult Males 0.180
***
 0.01865
*
 0.02232  
 [0.033] [0.00994] [0.01598]  
Constant -2.949
***
 0.10431
***
 -0.00009  
 [0.176] [0.03023] [0.04664]  
Region Fixed Effects 
 
Year Fixed Effects 
 
Household Fixed Effects 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Number obs. 7280 3541 1605  
 
Squared Correlation 
 
0.026 
 
0.297 
 
0.357 
 
Notes.Coefficients are reported with standard errors in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Variables net income, Village Fund and other loan sources are measured in 
10,000 Baht. Model 2 drops out all households that have a head who is a farmer. Model 3 drops out all 
households that received loans from sources other than Village Fund. Squared correlation is the squared 
correlations between the left-hand side variable and predicted value. 
 
Additional robustness checks confirm the approximate size and sign of the 
Village Fund (Table 10).  Model 1 (Table 10) displays how the results change when 
limited to poor households (below the 25
th
 percentile in net income). Model 2 (Table 10) 
drops households that do not have children aged 2 to 15. The rational for this model, is 
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the possibility that if households do not have other children, then they might not be able 
to conceive. Model 5 separated the BAAC from other loan sources. A significant 
proportion of loans come from the BAAC and it is useful to see its impacts. All the 
models have relatively similar coefficients. The sign on the Village Fund coefficient is 
the same and magnitude does not vary much. 
Table 10 
Robustness Checks 2 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Low Net Income Only Households w/ Children BAAC Separate 
Village Fund -0.02249 -0.01493 -0.01601
**
 
 [0.02415] [0.01079] [0.00763] 
Net Income -0.001 -0.0002 0.0002 
 [0.004] [0.0004] [0.0003] 
Other Children -0.055
***
 -0.079
***
 -0.063
***
 
 [0.011] [0.008] [0.006] 
Other Loans  (w/ BAAC) 0.0006 0.00002  
 [0.0008] [0.00032]  
Women >40 -0.015 0.024 0.020 
 [0.029] [0.017] [0.014] 
Women <40 (>15) 0.004 0.019
*
 0.040
***
 
 [0.017] [0.010] [0.008] 
Adult Males 0.024 0.015
*
 0.016
**
 
 [0.014] [0.008] [0.007] 
Farmer Head -0.004 -0.0004 -0.017 
 [0.024] [0.0138] [0.011] 
BAAC   0.00000004 
   [0.00000008] 
Other Loans (w/o BAAC)   0.000000002 
   [0.000000028] 
Constant 0.156
***
 0.227
***
 0.130
***
 
 [0.045] [0.029] [0.022] 
Household Fixed 
Effects 
 
Year Fixed Effects 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
Number obs. 1906 5028 7280 
 
Squared Correlation 
 
0.383 
 
0.234 
 
0.201 
Notes.Coefficients are reported with standard errors in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Variables netincome, villagefund and othermfp are measured in 10,000 Baht. 
Model 1 drops out households that had a net income above the 25
th
 percentile (31,500 baht). Model 2 only 
keeps households that had at least one child aged 2 to 15. Model 3 separated out BAAC from other loan 
sources. Squared correlation is the squared correlations between the left-hand side variable and predicted 
value. 
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7 Conclusion 
 The goal of this research was to identify how a microloan program impacted 
household fertility decisions in Thailand. The empirical evidence suggests that getting a 
microloan from the Thai Million Baht Village Fund had a negative impact on the number 
of babies a household had. Although the result was statistically significant, a family 
would have to borrow 1 million baht for the funds to result in 1.60 fewer babies. This 
amount is far beyond what anyone could borrow and is therefore of practical 
insignificance. 
 This result is important in the case of Thailand because of their unusually low 
fertility rates. My results showed a miniscule impact in the number of babies in a 
household after they borrowed from the Village Fund. The policy implications of this 
suggest that using microfinance programs as a development tool in Thailand is a 
beneficial use of development spending because it does not have a significant adverse 
effect on the country’s fertility rates. If the results were practically significant, this would 
suggest that Thailand would have to consider using other development tools that were not 
going to decrease fertility rates even further, or coupling a microfinance program with 
additional programs, like a childcare subsidy. This would lower the opportunity costs for 
women of having a child. 
 It is important to note that the small effects of the microfinance program on 
fertility might be due to the pre-existing trend of low fertility in Thailand. The fertility 
rates in Thailand are 1.5 births per woman. This is very low relative to other countries 
with only 27 countries having a lower fertility rate.
11
 There is a possibility that the 
                                                 
11
 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2127rank.html 
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fertility rate cannot easily drop much below 1.5 births per woman and that is why I do not 
see a significant impact of the microfinance program. 
 The impacts of microfinance on fertility are not typical areas of study. Most 
literature focused on the changes in GDP, consumption and expenditure. There are 
substantial issues associated with below replacement fertility. It results in labor shortages 
and can have detrimental impacts on the economy.  It was important to make sure that the 
unintended negative impacts of the microfinance program on household fertility did not 
outweigh the positive impacts on GDP and consumption. 
 There are a few potential issues to consider for the validity of this study. Attrition 
is a serious issue if certain types of households were leaving the survey. For further 
research, I would study the characteristics of these households to make sure there is not 
any reason to believe their exit from the survey is impacting my results. Omitted variable 
bias could also be having a harmful impact on my results. While it is nearly impossible to 
correctly specify this type of model without some amount of omitted variable bias, 
including more variables about household characteristics and village characteristics might 
better identify the impact of the Village Fund on household fertility. 
Along with correctly identifying the influential variables in a model, correctly 
specifying the time frame can be a challenge. There is potential that the number of lags I 
used was incorrect. I assumed the impacts of getting a loan would show up in the next 
year’s data because most studies of income shocks and fertility look at the fertility 
choices for the next year (Lindo 2010). Under my assumption, any fertility decisions that 
are caused by a household getting a loan will happen within a few months of the loan and 
then nine months later they have an additional child.  Surveys were given annually in 
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May. Based on when a household gets a loan in the survey cycle, a baby could show up 
in the next year’s survey or it might take two years for the survey to capture the extra 
child. It is possible that it would take longer for a microloan to impact fertility decisions 
and a two or three year lag would be more appropriate. To address this issue, in addition 
to leading my dependent variable, I included children ages 0 to 2 with the hopes that this 
will solve for any timing issues.  
One weakness of my research is the absence of specific fertility data. To complete 
my research, I made certain assumptions to validate my dependent variable. One 
assumption is that a child aged 0 to 2 is a child conceived by someone who also lives in 
the same household. If I had individual-level fertility data, I could more accurately 
identify the causal relationship between receiving a microloan and having a child.  
 The last issue is the access versus participation distinction that Buttenheim 
(2006) and Sukontamarn (2006) discuss. If it truly is the access to a microfinance 
program that results in changes to fertility decisions rather than actual participation, my 
results could be incorrect. Every village in my sample has the Village Fund program, so 
any changes due to solely having the program in the village would not be observable with 
the data I used. For further research, it would be useful to find a data set that has villages 
with and without the program and use villages without the program as a control. 
Using an 11-year panel dataset from Thailand spanning pre and post-program 
years, I assess how the Thai Million Baht Village Fund program influenced household 
fertility. With a fixed-effects model and an instrumental variable technique I analyze the 
changes in the number of new children in a household. 
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Despite the aforementioned caveats, I find a negative impact of getting a Village 
Fund microloan on fertility that is statistically significant but not practically significant. 
This negative relationship supports much of the existing literature. This research is 
especially important for Thailand because of their dangerously low fertility rates. My 
findings do not suggest any immediate policy adjustments, but rather, rule out a potential 
negative unintended consequence of microfinance in Thailand.  
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